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FROM WELLINGTON TO QUEBEC: ATTRACTING HOLLYWOOD AND REGULATING 
CULTURAL WORKERS  
Accepted manuscript for Industrial Relations/Relations Industrielle Quarterly 
Review; 72-3 2017 
 
MAUDE CHOKO AND BRIDGET CONOR 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The nature of work arrangements in the film industry and the professional characteristics 
of cultural workers involved in film production impact the legal qualification of these 
workers. They highlight the difficult task of classifying actual work arrangements in one 
specific legal category: either an “employment relationship” or a “contract for services 
relationship”. If adequate legal frameworks are not in place to capture the reality of those 
work arrangements properly, the legal qualification may lead to uncertainty detrimental to 
workers’ access to collective representation. This uncertainty opens the door to work 
conflicts and contestations of different types. This paper builds a dialogue between two 
disciplines, legal analysis and cultural labour analysis, by comparing two locally embedded 
case studies: the “Hobbit law” in New Zealand and the “Spiderwick Case” in Quebec 
(Canada). In both cases, particular mechanisms of policymaking and legislation are integral 
to the development and smooth functioning of local labour markets – from tax credits to the 
provision of collective bargaining tools for freelance cultural workers. However, as we will 
show, the nature of these cases and the labour disputes therein led to vastly differing 
outcomes for the status of cultural workers and their working conditions. This comparative 
approach illustrates the continued importance of local and regional regulations governing 
the employment of film workers even as local industries may tailor these regulations in 
order to attract and appease Hollywood producers. The interdisciplinary dialogue 
underpinning this comparison is crucial, we argue, for understanding the different 
strategies that local industries use to legislate for the uncertain employment status of 
cultural workers. 
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PART ONE: COMBINING CULTURAL LABOUR AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
The field of cultural labour studies has grown considerably in recent years, a field which 
draws on scholarship from the sociology of work, cultural studies and political economy 
(indicative authors include McRobbie, 1998; Banks, 2007; Conor, 2014; Gill, 2007; 
Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011). As Gill and Pratt (2008: 14) state, “a number of relatively 
stable features of this kind of work”, that is, the production of media and cultural goods, 
have been identified: 
 
A preponderance of temporary, intermittent and precarious jobs; long hours and 
bulimic patterns of working; the collapse or  erasure of boundaries between work 
and play, poor pay, high levels of mobility; passionate attachment to the work and to 
the identity of the creative labourer; an attitudinal mindset that is a blend of 
bohemianism and entrepreneurialism; informal work environments and distinctive 
forms of sociality; and profound experiences of insecurity and anxiety about finding 
work, earning enough money and ‘keeping up’ in rapidly changing fields (Ibid). 
 
Empirical investigations of cultural labour have examined local, regional and transnational 
forms of cultural production. Studies of cultural work are also often premised on the 
assumption that this work is post-Fordist, flexible, mobile and often lacking histories of 
industrial organization, especially when it comes to wholly new forms of virtual or digital 
labour. Cultural work is frequently classed as “atypical” or “non-standard” (by the 
International Labour Organisation, 2014 for example). Atypical work is defined in 
opposition with typical work, i.e. work done under a contract of employment of 
indeterminate duration, on a full-time basis, for one unique employer, under his or her 
control and often on their work premises (Vallée, 2005, Cranford et al., 2005). For unions, 
this atypical nature of work might constitute a challenge as it can be difficult, under general 
labour relations regimes, to capture, retain and represent the interests and needs of 
cultural workers. But, as our specific cases illustrate, film production industries are 
populated by a number of strong unions and guilds that represent their largely freelance 
membership and, in many cases, have done so for decades (see for example Gray and 
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Seeber, 1996). What has not been given significant attention in cultural labour literature, 
however, is a consideration of legislation and jurisprudence itself – that is, analysis of the 
legal frameworks and mechanisms that may support cultural workers and the unions and 
other organizations that represent them and, conversely, may also undermine the status of 
cultural workers and their collectives. Broader analysis of precarious employment 
(Standing, 2011, Vosko, 2007, for example) has highlighted the ways in which forms of 
collective organization are now being seriously tested as the boundaries of employment 
relationships shift and dissolve. Legal and social mechanisms to support precarious and 
unstable cultural workers are absolutely crucial, and yet in many places and spaces, they 
have been subject to rapid change and, in some cases, to direct attack and erosion. 
 
To discuss the legal status of cultural workers and their organizations presents particular 
challenges, not least because of the need to build analytical bridges across disciplines which 
requires navigating and clarifying the diverse range of terms used in both cultural labour 
studies and legal analysis. A variety of terms and formulations have been used to describe 
the work conducted in the production of art and culture and the divisions within that work. 
Indicative terms include cultural work and workers (Banks, 2007), creative labour 
(Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011), artists (Choko, 2015), “below-the-line” technicians or 
crew versus “above-the-line”i  creatives (Scott, 2005, Miller et al., 2005). For our purposes, 
we use the terms artists and cultural workers and, within our case studies, we refer 
specifically to film workers. In addition, when considering applicable legal frameworks to 
these workers, an additional difficulty consists of grasping these realities within the limited 
legal categories available, i.e. employee or independent contractorii. And the legal 
qualification is crucial since it determines the access the worker has to  certain legal 
frameworks and his or her eventual inclusion or exclusion from certain protections under 
labour law regulation. Part two of this paper deals more specifically with these legal 
qualifications. 
 
Studies of cultural labour often utilize interviews and ethnographic observation as well as  
analysis of labour market data, funding and tax credit policy and so on. The studies we are 
comparing here are also informed by this previous work and combine a cultural labour 
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framework with legal analysis. Doing so offers a more finely-grained analysis of legislative 
frameworks themselves – those that determine how labour laws in relation to film workers 
are drafted, enacted and fought.  The legal analysis we rely on in our comparison, which can 
be qualified as a positivist legal method, encompasses research using two essential sources 
from which emanate legal norms: the legislation and the jurisprudence, and a third source, 
which is complementary to the first two: the legal literature.  Here, we use the legal method 
to first reveal what the law says in both jurisdictions in order to compare them in our 
subsequent analysis. We then combine the legal method with a cultural labour analysis of 
our chosen cases; we do this to transcend the positivist approach so as to bring to light not 
only what the law invokes, but also how it operates and the differing material effects the 
legislation has on the status of cultural workers. In the next section, we develop our legal 
analysis for both cases, drawing on a discussion of the employment case law itself. 
 
 
PART TWO. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CULTURAL WORKERS AND COLLECTIVE 
REPRESENTATION 
 
In both Quebec and New Zealand jurisdictions, the legal status of “employee” gives the 
worker access to protective labour legislation allowing for collective representation and 
minimal standards. In New Zealand, this protection derives from the Employment Relations 
Act 2000 (ERA). Enacted in 2000, it modernized the labour legislation in New Zealand. In 
Quebec, while minimal standards are provided for in the Act Respecting Labour Standards 
(CQLR, c. N-1.1), collective representation is facilitated by the Labour Code (CQLR, c. C-27), 
which establishes the general labour relations regime. This regime is similar to those of 
other provincial and federal jurisdictions in Canada, as they were all deeply influenced by 
the Wagner Act Model from the United States (National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-
169 (1935)).  
 
Both Quebec and New Zealand labour legislation oppose the status of “employee” to the one 
of “independent contractor”, attributed to workers who are not delivering services under a 
“contract of employment” (Quebec) or a “contract of services” (New Zealand), but rather 
work on their own account, such as exploiting their own business and offering their 
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services. This latter contractual relationship is referred to as a “contract for services”. 
Comparable legal tests were developed in both jurisdictions to determine, in specific 
situations, whether a worker must be considered an employee or an independent 
contractor. In situations of atypical work, this qualification may be difficult. In particular, 
because the reality of self-employment is heterogeneous (D’Amours, 2006), it poses a 
challenge to legal tests as developed in past decades. As Cranford et al., (2005: 4) put it: 
 
“Self-employed workers have an ambiguous status. Traditionally, self-employment 
has been equated with entrepreneurship. Legally, it is considered a form of 
independent contracting and thus outside the ambit of labour protection and 
collective bargaining. But the evidence suggests that many of the self-employed, 
especially those who do not employ other workers, are much more like employees 
than they are like entrepreneurs. There is controversy over where to draw the line 
between employees and entrepreneurs when it comes to labour protection for the 
self-employed.” 
 
The basis underlying the qualification is that priority is given to factual circumstances, 
which need to be analyzed and carefully considered in each case, rather than on the written 
stipulations of the parties involved in the contractual relationship under review (Bryson v. 
Three Foot Six Ltd, [2005] NZSC 34 for New Zealand; 67112 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries 
Canada inc. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 983 for Quebec). In New Zealand, such written stipulations are 
considered one element amongst others. In deciding the legal qualification of a worker, two 
tests were developed: the control and integration test and the fundamental test (Three Foot 
Six, para.10). These tests lead one to take into consideration, along with the written 
contract between the parties, if any, elements such as the intention of the parties, the 
industry practice, the control exercised over the work, the integration of the workers to the 
business of the work provider, the process established for remuneration, the participation 
of the worker in relation to the work provider’s profits or losses, the worker’s investment in 
his or her own plant and equipment, the dependency on a unique work provider on the part 
of the worker, and the requirement of training (Three Foot Six, para.7-14). In Quebec, 
several tests have been developed over the years, but the element of control remains a 
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determining factor in qualifying the contractual relationship of the parties (Fudge, Tucker 
and Vosko, 2003). In evaluating the level of control over the worker, one has to also 
consider “whether the worker provides his or her own equipment, whether the worker 
hires his or her own helpers, the degree of financial risk taken by the worker, the degree of 
responsibility for investment and management held by the worker, and the worker’s 
opportunity for profit in the performance of his or her tasks” (Sagaz Industries, para.47). 
 
In film production, the organization of work is such that the line between an employment 
relationship and a contractual (New Zealand) or service (Quebec) relationship can be hard 
to draw. Indeed, film production is project-based. This industry is “diverse, complex, multi-
sector and multi-occupation” (De Bruin and Dupuis, 2004: 59). As a consequence, artists 
involved in film production work for different work providers simultaneously, on a fixed-
term basis, which is often short, and without any certitude to be re-engaged by the same 
work provider once the project is done (Pichette, 1984; The Conference Board of Canada, 
2010). In addition, the work is done in different locations and with different teams. 
 
In the task of legally qualifying workers involved in film productions, both jurisdictions 
faced similar ambivalence, but have eventually taken very different stances, which led to 
opposite consequences in the actual protection granted to these workers. In Quebec, the 
question was indirectly dealt with in 1982, when an artists’ association not legally 
recognised under the Canada Labour Code (R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, “CLC”), i.e. the Union des 
artistes (UDA), tried to get a certification to represent freelancers hired by Radio-Canada (a 
national broadcaster). The litigation did not involve workers in film production per se. 
Rather, it involved workers in radio and television production, but its outcome impacted 
film production as well. Indeed, the administrative tribunal refused to grant the 
certification application because it came to the conclusion that the artists included in the 
application were employees rather than independent contractors. As such, they were 
considered as falling within the scope of the existing CLC. Hence, they could be regrouped in 
existing bargaining units, for which other unions already detained bargaining rights under 
the CLC, as nothing prevented regular employees and “freelancer employees” from being 
reunited. At the same time, the tribunal declared that the UDA could not get any bargaining 
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rights while representing independent contractors, as they were excluded from the labour 
relations legislation (Union des artistes et aI. and Société Radio-Canada [1982] 44 D.l. 19). 
UDA faced a dilemma. Either it could continue representing its members outside of the 
scope of the existing labour regimes, which meant doing so without any legally binding 
obligations on its counterparts to actually recognize its legitimacy and bargaining power, or 
it could encourage its members to leave for other unions representing “employees” in order 
to fall under the protection of a labour relations regime. Because UDA’s members defined 
themselves as “freelancers”, in contrast with “employees” (and regardless of legal tests and 
qualifications), and because they had been organized inside UDA for many years already, 
they chose to pressure the government to adopt a specific labour relations regime for 
artists (along with several other existing artists’ associations at the time). The idea was to 
clarify the legal status of artists, to avoid further ambiguity (not only in relation to labour 
issues, but also with respect to taxes), and to provide them with a specific labour relations 
regime designed for independent contractors. It resulted in the adoption, in 1987, of an 
innovative piece of legislation, the Act Respecting the Professional Status and Conditions of 
Engagement of Performing, Recording and Film Artists (CQLR, c. S-32.1, “APS”). The APS 
provides a labour relations regime for artists as independent contractors, and grants their 
associations the legal right to represent them. It applies equally to several cultural 
industries, namely stage, multimedia, making of films (for any type of screen), recording of 
audio discs or other modes of sound recording, dubbing and recording of commercial 
advertisements (APS, section 1). 
 
In New Zealand, a different path was taken. In 2000, a new piece of legislation entered into 
force, the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA). This legislation did not address specifically 
the question of film production workers. It was open for courts to decide whether or not it 
would protect these workers by recognizing them as “employees”. However, the industry 
practice was to consider these workers as independent contractors, due to the “project-
based, intermittent nature of screen productions and the transferable skills of industry 
practitioners, almost all of whom work on several projects for several different producers 
during the course of the year depending on their skill base and availability of work” (Three 
Foot Six, para.11). As a consequence, these workers would have been excluded from the 
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protection of this labour legislation. In contrast to this conclusion, when the issue was 
raised in front of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in 2005 in the case Three Foot Six, it 
was decided that regardless of the industry practice, single factual circumstances could lead 
to the protection of the legislation, the worker being qualified as an “employee”. As a result, 
the decision allowed for a worker to address a request to the Employment Court in order to 
be declared an employee within the meaning of the ERA to benefit from its application 
(ERA, Section 187 (1) f)), notwithstanding the terminology used in his or her contract, 
following the industry practice, with his or her work provider. This conclusion from the 
Supreme Court represented good news as it now sent the signal that cultural workers could, 
depending on their circumstances, benefit from the labour protections under the legislation. 
At the same time, it was not a strong victory as it remained a burden on each worker to 
obtain such protection by proving in the context of judicial litigation that even though he or 
she was treated as an independent contractor by his or her employer, in reality he or she 
should benefit from the protections under the labour regulation granted to employees.  
 
While having a common distinction between “employee” and “independent contractor” 
status in relation to labour protection, Quebec and New Zealand pursued different solutions 
in trying to treat artists in film production as workers with protection. On the one 
hand,Quebec had adopted a specific legislation for these artists, which recognised their 
right to collectively organize and bargain as independent contractors, hence clarifying at 
the same time their legal status. On the other, New Zealand had judicially opened the door 
to legally qualify these artists as “employees” in order to grant them the protection of the 
ERA. It is in light of this legal context that we now turn to the sets of events that we focus on 
for the remainder of our discussion. 
 
 
PART THREE: HOLLYWOOD PRODUCTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGE: THE HOWS 
AND WHYS IN QUEBEC AND NEW ZEALAND 
 
To present the Spiderwick and the Hobbit cases, separated by a few years and many 
kilometres, we will follow a chronological order, beginning in 2005 with the Spiderwick 
case in Quebec. In outlining and comparing these cases, a legal analysis, though essential, 
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would be insufficient to understand the reasons behind the choice of the specific legal 
solution adopted in response to strikingly similar issues. As such, we draw on cultural 
labour analysis in amalgamation with legal analysis. Introducing elements from cultural 
labour analysis allows us to better grasp the broader rationale for the legal solution 
adopted in each jurisdiction. Thus we pay particular attention to (a) the local industrial 
conditions within which both disputes arose and (b) the very different political investments 
that were made in the uncertainty of the employment relationships that both cases 
illuminated.  
 
A. QUEBEC/SPIDERWICK 
 
The International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, 
Artists and Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories and Canada (IATSE) is a union 
representing more than 125 000 workers involved in all behind the scenes work in the 
entertainment industry in the USA, as well as in Canada. The Alliance québécoise des 
techniciens de l’image et du son (AQTIS) is an association representing 4500 workers 
involved in behind the scenes work in movie productions in Quebec.  
 
In the aftermath of the adoption of the APS in Quebec, associations of workers in artistic 
productions sought legal recognition under the newly adopted legislation. During that 
exercise, some categories of technicians involved in movie productions failed to be 
recognised as “artists” because they were found to be providing services that did not fit 
either the “performance” or the “creative” requirements contained in the definition of an 
artist under section 1.1 of the legislation. As a consequence, they were excluded from the 
APS scope of application (Association des producteurs de films et de vidéo du Québec 
(A.P.F.V.Q.) and Syndicat des techniciennes et techniciens du cinéma et de la vidéo du Québec 
(S.T.C.V.Q.), D.T.E. 89T-747). AQTIS was still able to negotiate collective agreements with a 
few producers for these workers, but this was done on a voluntary basis to preserve the 
industrial peace (APFTQ memorandum, 2009). There was no possibility to force the 
producer in cases where they would refuse such negotiation, contrarily to what would 
happen under the APS. As a consequence, the benefit of working conditions collectively 
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bargained for was far from systematic. For these movie technicians, contrary to the new 
situation under the APS for workers able to obtain the qualification of “artist”, the 
uncertainty remained. 
 
In 2005, a conflict between two rival unions representing these technicians took place 
(Dionne and Lesage, 2010). Some unsatisfied technicians represented by AQTIS decided to 
seize the opportunity of a long-term Hollywood production, the film The Spiderwick 
Chronicles (2008) shooting in Quebec, to establish a new local branch affiliated to IATSE in 
Quebec (IATSE local 514, 2015). IATSE sought to obtain the right to legally represent movie 
technicians hired to work on foreign productions shot in Quebec. To do so, it applied for 
certification by filing a request to the Commission des relations de travail (CRT), the tribunal 
then administering the application of the Labour Code of Quebec (LCQ). The reasoning was 
that the workers for which the representation was sought were “employees” covered by the 
LCQ. We can make the proposition that the duration of the work relationship, which was 
scheduled for several months, and the nature of the relation between the producer and the 
technicians, the technicians working under the producer’s control, were arguments 
sustaining the IATSE’s position. Both of these arguments recall the criteria for the legal 
qualification of an employment relationship.  
 
Aware of the attempt of IATSE to obtain a certification for movie technicians in Quebec, 
AQTIS reacted promptly. A few days prior to the actual application for certification by 
IATSE being filed, AQTIS sent a notice to bargain to Paramount Productions (Spiderwick 
being a production of Paramount) under the APS. Paramount refused to negotiate pending 
the CRT’s decision about the certification application of IATSE for the same group of 
workers. AQTIS then presented to the Commission de reconnaissance des associations 
d’artistes et des associations de producteurs (CRAAAP, the tribunal overseeing the 
application of the APS at the time) a request to force Paramount to bargain under the APS, 
invoking the fact that it already held a legal recognition, under the APS, to represent movie 
technicians in Quebec. The request was granted by the CRAAAP (AQTIS and Spiderwick 
Productions inc. and IATSE, 2006 CRAAAP 426).  
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As a result of this inter-union conflict, many Hollywood productions decided to ban Quebec 
as a possible destination for their shooting, declaring Montreal as a “no shoot zone” 
(Guardia, 2006: 8). The idea of not knowing in advance and with certitude which set of 
working conditions should prevail on productions made many production companies 
reluctant to shoot their films in Quebec. The equivalent of more than 300 million dollars in 
contracts was considered to be lost in the industry due to the cancellation of production 
due to shoot in Quebec (Doyon, 2007).  
 
In the spring of 2007, in light of the duration of the work conflict and the negative impact it 
had on work opportunities and revenues in the industry, the Quebec government decided to 
appoint a mediator to help both unions to come to an agreement (Ministère de la Culture, 
des Communications et de la Condition féminine, 2009). The objectives of the mediation 
were twofold. In the short term, the idea was to “restore a working environment conducive 
to the welcoming of foreign shootings”. In the long term, it was to “find durable solutions to 
the conflict” (L’Allier, Boutin and Sasseville, 2010: 9) so such inter-union conflicts could be 
avoided in the future. 
 
Parallel to this intervention, a group of people from the Quebec movie industry were sent to 
Los Angeles to let the producers know of the progress in the inter-union conflict and the 
imminence of legislative amendments aimed at ensuring industrial peace for the future. The 
goal of the mission was unequivocal: the idea was to bring back Hollywood productions to 
Quebec (Morissette, 2007). As it was later reported by one of the participants in this 
mission, during the parliamentary debates surrounding the adoption of amendments to the 
APS, the Quebec team declared to the Hollywood producers:  
 
Listen, as soon as we have the confirmation that the Bill is adopted, we will inform 
you by letter. (our translation)(Lemay, 2009: n(15h40)n) 
 
It was reported by the same person that the response from Hollywood producers was 
positive. 
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And they [Hollywood producers] are ready, they have named us precise titles that 
are considering Montreal [as a shooting location], but they are on hold for this… for 
the adoption of this legislation. They do not want to face any more hint of industrial 
instability (our translation)(Lemay, 2009: n(15h40)n). 
 
The outcome of the mediation was an agreement between the two rival unions. In June 
2009, the Quebec government passed Bill 32. The legislative amendments to the APS 
integrated the precise terms of the agreement between the parties. These included a 
redefinition of each union jurisdiction over workers’ representation in the movie 
production industry (the industry being divided into four sectors, each union representing 
two, resulting in IATSE being the union for American high-budget productions and “Majors” 
productions and AQTIS for American mid- to low-budget productions and all other foreign 
and local productions) (Bill 32, sections 35 and 36 and Schedule I). The amendments also 
broaden the scope of the APS as it now covers movie technicians, as listed in section 1.2 of 
the APS, notwithstanding whether they can qualify as an “artist” according to past 
jurisprudence (and despite the absence of “creation” or “interpretation” in their work). 
 
The Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers (AMPTP), representing American 
producers, later pronounced itself in favour of Bill 32, stating: 
 
[t]he film and television industry is global, mobile, and highly competitive. Among 
the factors which determine where productions are filmed are certainty and labour 
relations stability. It has been the AMPTP's experience that one of the main 
contributors to growth and prosperity of the film and television industry is labour 
stability achieved through collective bargaining and long-term collective 
agreements. Certainty and labour stability fosters the employment of workers in 
economically viable businesses, encourages cooperative participation between 
employers and trade unions in resolving workplace issues, adapting to changes in 
the industry and in the economy, and develops workforce skills, workforces, and 
workplaces that promote productivity. These factors facilitate the welcoming 
environment necessary to maintain and grow the industry (AMPTP, 2009). 
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B. WELLINGTON/HOBBIT 
 
To now turn to New Zealand, a dispute began in October 2010 involving the International 
Federation of Actors (FIA), New Zealand Actors Equity (NZAE, representing around 400 
local actors), the Australian actors’ guild (the Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance, 
MEAA, of which NZAE is an independent affiliate) and the producers of The Hobbit films 
(principally, Three Foot Six Productions and Warner Brothers), concerning the use of non-
unionized actors in the production. In New Zealand, film workers’ unions represent “above-
the-line” workers such as actors (the NZAE) and writers (Writers Guild of New Zealand) 
and “below-the-line” technicians can be represented by the New Zealand Film and Video 
Technician’s Guild (NZF&VTG). They are then supported by the larger Council of Trade 
Unions (CTU). However, these are voluntary organizations with relatively small 
memberships and this is partly reflected in the size of the industry and its workforce. Two 
agreements have been used as a guideline for film industry working conditions, both 
negotiated with SPADA (the Screen Producers and Directors Association of New Zealand): 
The Pink Book which covers best practice in the engagement of screen cast (this has now 
changed to the SPADA/NZAE Individual Performance Agreement) and The Blue Book which 
covers best practice for screen crew (SPADA, 2016). These best practices cover a range of 
issues from contracts and residuals, to working hours, to health and safety, and dispute 
resolution. These are guidelines only and are not legally binding. Producers (both 
international and local) can offer their own contracts to engage cast and crew in New 
Zealand and can incorporate all or none of the Pink and Blue Book recommendations. As 
Kelly (2011) highlights, there had been concerns that New Zealand film workers had 
experienced “deterioriating” conditions in the industry, with both local and international 
producers “reducing conditions” and not complying with various aspects of the Pink and 
Blue Books. 
 
In this context, NZAE decided to use a large-scale Hollywood production planning to shoot 
in New Zealand, as a prominent case to try to bargain collectively for a standard and 
binding employment contract that would bring its members in line with the contracts under 
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which other actors working on the films would work  (as U.S. members of unions  
represented by the Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio 
Artists (SAG-AFTRA)). This came after the NZAE had attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to 
negotiate collectively on behalf of their members on New Zealand produced television 
productions such as Outrageous Fortune (Kelly, 2011). In May 2010, a contract of 
employment was sent to NZAE and to agents to engage cast in The Hobbit films. This 
contract did not conform to  and even ignored many of the Pink Book recommendations and 
offered no residual payments to New Zealand performers. The NZAE took this contract to 
the FIA, the umbrella organization with international jurisdiction in relation to performers’ 
trade unions and guilds. By August, the FIA had contacted Warner Brothers, the Hollywood 
studio issuing the contracts, notifying that it wanted to bargain terms and conditions 
collectively and Warners refused to bargain. The FIA then issued a ‘do not work’ order to its 
members and affiliates (Tyson, 2011). 
 
When these New Zealand workers raised concerns about their labour conditions and these 
concerns were shared by international branches of their union, the local producers of the 
films, including the director Peter Jackson, reiterated the refusal to negotiate or engage in 
collective bargaining and threatened that the production would “go east” (to Eastern 
Europe) if the dispute was not quickly resolved. Over the proceeding days, New Zealand 
union representatives met with the producers, but the dispute was also recast in the New 
Zealand media as a “boycott” by New Zealand actors against the Hobbit producers, 
including Warner Brothers and Peter Jackson and his production team, and this led to street 
protests, led both by other local film workers concerned about their job security, as well as 
members of the public (Child, 2010). 
 
The resolution to the dispute came after the widespread vilification of the NZAE and its 
members. Within a few months, the FIA had lifted the ‘do-not-work’ after discussion 
between representatives of NZAE, MEAA, New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (CTU), 
Warner Brothers, the principal Hollywood financers of the films, and New Zealand 
government ministers. But in the mainstream New Zealand media, the local film industry 
was framed by the producers as inherently ‘risky’ and precarious as a result of the union 
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action (Kelly, 2011). As in the Spiderwick case, New Zealand, was labelled a “no-go zone”. In 
this context, and rather than industry representatives travelling to Hollywood as in the 
Spiderwick case (and although the ‘do-not-work’ order had already been lifted), Warner 
Brothers’ executives flew to New Zealand to engage in further negotiations with the New 
Zealand government. Generous tax breaks and forms of marketing subsidization were 
offered by the New Zealand government and willingly accepted by Warner Brothers, and 
these totalled nearly $NZ100 million (McAndrew and Risak, 2012: 71). The agreement also 
enacted ‘emergency’ overnight changes to New Zealand employment legislation that 
ensured that New Zealand film workers would never be legally considered to be employees 
in this industry in the future. They will always be, and by default be, independent 
contractors. As McAndrew and Risak characterize it, such legislation led to “effectively 
‘immunizing’ the New Zealand film industry against union activity and legislated 
employment regulation” (Ibid: 57). McAndrew and Risak go on to note in their analysis that 
this specific legislative change can now conveniently be extended to other workers or 
workplaces in New Zealand, or, as they call it, a “textbook example of an effective strategy to 
keep a workplace, an industry or even a national labour market union-free and 
unregulated” (Ibid: 74).  
 
 
 
 
 
PART FOUR: NEW/NO BOUNDARIES OF FILM PRODUCTION WORK 
 
 
The Hobbit and the Spiderwick cases illustrate in a vibrant way the influence of economic 
arguments on decisionmaking at the government level. In both cases, the threat of losing 
the perceived crucial revenues of the film industry captured policy makers’ attention and 
convinced them of the necessity to address these respective conflicts. In both cases, the 
legislative body was called into action to amend relevant legislation. And in both cases, the 
uncertainty with respect to the employment/work relation for cultural workers was 
alleviated, with very different effects however. 
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It is also noteworthy that this intervention led not only to legislative amendment, but that 
the modifications adopted were customized to fit the specifics of the particular problem 
with which each government was confronted in each case. It resulted in more detailed 
wording in the legislation, rather than the adoption of more general rules. For example, in 
New Zealand’s ERA, provision 6 defines who is an employee, regardless of the specific 
industry, except for the exclusion in relation to film, which reads “excludes, in relation to a 
film production, any of the following persons: (i) a person engaged in film production work 
as an actor, voice-over actor, stand-in, body double, stunt performer, extra, singer, musician, 
dancer or entertainer: (ii) a person engaged in film production work in any other capacity.” 
In Quebec, while an artist is defined in general terms as a “natural person who practices an 
art on his own account and offers his services, for remuneration, as a creator or performer 
in a field of artistic endeavour referred to in section 1”, provision 1.2 exemplifies the 
detailed nature of the wording adopted to resolve the conflict:  
 
“1.2. In the context of an audiovisual production mentioned in Schedule I, a natural 
person who, whether covered by section 1.1 or not, exercises on his own account one 
of the following occupations, or an occupation judged analogous by the Commission, 
and offers his services for remuneration is considered to be an artist: 
 
(1) an occupation relating to the design, planning, setting up, making or applying of 
costumes, hairstyles, prostheses, make-up, puppets, scenery, sets, lighting, images, 
sound, photography, visual or sound effects, special effects, or any occupation 
relating to recording; 
 
 (2) an occupation relating to sound or picture editing and continuity; 
 
(3) the occupations of script supervisor or location scout manager, and occupations 
relating to the management or logistics of an efficient and safe shoot, whether 
indoors or outdoors, including the transport and handling of equipment and 
accessories; 
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(4) the occupations of trainee, team leader and assistant in relation to persons 
exercising occupations referred to in this section or section 1.1. 
 
The following are not covered by this section: accounting, auditing, management and 
representation, legal and advertising services, or similar administrative services that 
have only a peripheral contributing value or interest in the creation of a work.” 
 
However, while there are some similarities between the two cases, the ways in which the 
conflict was handled by the various stakeholders involved in each and the net outcome of 
each case is dramatically different. Firstly, the nature of the interventions by the Hollywood 
producers was quite clearly dissimilar. In Quebec, Paramount producers were consulted 
and provided their opinion but did not seek to intervene directly, nor was there evidence 
here that producers had a direct stake in the clarification of the employment/work 
relationship for film workers. Either way, the producers were aware that the workers 
would, from now on, benefit from collective representation and the alternative was 
between one legal framework (LCQ) and the other (APS). Total exclusion of the movie 
technicians was not among the solutions contemplated. In contrast, and as the development 
of the ‘Hobbit law’ illustrates, Warner Brothers executives and the local producers worked 
very closely with New Zealand government officials. In fact, subsequent claims have been 
made that deception was used in order to pass the ‘emergency’ legislation that served both 
the Hollywood producers and the government (see Conor, 2015). In the latter case, the 
uncertainty across and within the categories of ‘employee’ and ‘independent contractor’ 
were certainly clarified and this was enacted by the removal of the employee category 
altogether. Secondly, the responses of the state also differ significantly. In Quebec, 
government officials took up the role of mediator in the process to assist the rival unions in 
reaching an agreement. They listened to and consulted with film workers’ representatives 
before then amending the legislation and, more fundamentally, the rights of these workers 
to represent themselves and collectively bargain were assumed rather than threatened or 
denied. In New Zealand, as we said above, the government worked with the producers and 
sought legal opinions to support this position and, as some scholars have argued, much of 
the available evidence points to their operations as directly ‘anti-union’ (for example, Kelly, 
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2011; McAndrew and Risak, 2012). Thirdly, the nature of the conflict itself is clearly 
different. In the case of Quebec, there was an a priori recognition that film workers were 
represented by either IATSE or AQTIS and thus the central question and conflict was about 
that representation i.e: “who has the jurisdiction to represent them?”  The dispute was then 
focused on clarifying the work relation as it was understood in discussion between the 
workers and the unions, the state and the producers. In New Zealand, the a priori position 
was no recourse to collective bargaining. The dispute was then premised on the ongoing 
inequalities that a large Hollywood production exposes between unionized workers and 
non-unionized workers. In this case, local film workers sought to halt the uncertainty and 
insecurity of their employment status by requesting a collective bargaining process and this 
was denied by both producers and the state. This uncertainty was in fact alleviated, but was 
done so by removing a legislative category of work altogether. And this in fact opens up a 
new set of uncertainties with respect to the ways in which film workers as independent 
contractors, and their collective organizations may now be in breach of anti-competition 
law. Indeed, as McCrystal (2014) argues, some workers in film production do benefit from 
collective representation through several associations that preceded the Three Foot Six 
ruling. Uncertainty remains, however, because as McCrystal goes on to outline, common law 
presents some challenges to the ability of these associations to create and enforce collective 
bargaining and collective agreements. Moreover, further challenges are thrown up by the 
Commerce Act, under which forms of collective association could be framed as ‘market 
identification’ and ‘conduct short of price-fixing’, thus breaching local competition law 
(McCrystal, 2014). Fourthly, the subsequent legislative changes reflected these starkly 
different contexts. In Quebec, the process of consultation and moderation was genuine, 
conducted in good faith and thus the adoption of legislative change reflected this. In New 
Zealand, the cloak-and-dagger nature of change (overnight, without consultation and 
possibly with key information being withheld from union officials and from the public, see 
Kelly, 2011) and the unequivocal legislative outcome (removing permanent employment as 
a default/typical position for film workers) could not be in greater contrast to the 
Spiderwick case. 
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Overall, these two cases are worth comparing because of exactly these surprising and 
extreme differences. It is worth reiterating that the broader economic landscape for both 
disputes is very similar. Both Quebec and New Zealand are locations for Hollywood 
filmmaking and, considering Hollywood producers’ and studios’ preoccupation with risk 
reduction, keeping the “industrial peace” is paramount for both industries. Policymakers, 
local producers, union representatives and film workers recognized in both cases that 
labour disputes are costly and highlight the differing investments that all these 
stakeholders have in maintaining or disrupting that peace. What is most instructive for us is 
that these stakes and their legislative outcomes are in such stark opposition. In Quebec, the 
resolution to the dispute involved the sharing of the responsibilities and requirements of 
collective representation between the rival unions and explicitly included technicians 
within the scope of the APS for the film industry. This was legislated in order to avoid 
further litigation surrounding the issue of their protection and to ensure these workers the 
same framework for bargaining as other artists working on the same productions. Thus, the 
uncertainties of employment/work were clarified via an inclusive process as the 
amendments to the wording in the legislation also illuminate. In contrast, the dispute that 
led to the “Hobbit law” was resolved by an exclusive process. All film workers (whether 
“above-the-line” actors or “below-the-line” technicians) were explicitly excluded from the 
ERA in order to avoid any litigation surrounding the issue of their protection under this 
legislation. The boundaries of employment were clarified via a process of exclusion – the 
wholesale removal of a permanent or typical employment relationship in favour of an 
atypical one. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When the Quebec government considered amending the APS, a union representing another 
sub-sector of cultural workers underlined an interesting discrepancy during the 
consultation process. In its memorandum, the union highlighted that while the solution put 
forward for film technicians resolved the problem of inclusion of these workers within the 
scope of the APS, it did nothing to address the problem in relation to technicians in other 
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kinds of production (i.e. theatre/stage) (APASQ, 2009). The issue surrounding their 
collective representation under the APS remained unsolved. In New Zealand, a central 
concern has been that the “Hobbit law” may be applied to other kinds of workers far 
beyond the cultural sector and there has been speculation that it was an ulterior move 
within the larger free-trade agenda of the current government (Kelsey, 2012). Thus the 
bargaining, shifting and clarification over the boundaries of employment continues. A 
crucial area of further investigation, although beyond the scope of this paper, is a 
comparative political economic analysis that considers how the broader political climate in 
each location has influenced the very different legislative outcomes we have outlined. 
However, the principle motivation for this comparison is combining the resources of legal 
and cultural labour analysis in order to consider how legislation is being framed and 
enacted in local industries to tackle the uncertainties facilitated by international production 
activity.  
 
When analyzed together, these two cases highlight the differing role(s) and status of unions 
and guilds for cultural workers as they navigate the continued uncertainties of employment 
for their members and affiliates. They also highlight the ways in which, in the context of 
these uncertainties, legislation can both serve and limit the rights and freedoms of cultural 
workers. Our concern, and thus our motivation for analyzing these two cases together, is 
that there are vastly different possibilities in the outcomes of such bargaining. Here lies a 
continuum on which these two cases represent the two poles. It is crucial that we continue 
to deploy interdisciplinary analysis – cultural labour studies combined with legal analysis  - 
to understand the ways in which legislative mechanisms can determine the forceful 
inclusion or exclusion of workers from collective representation, including collective 
bargaining, and fair and equitable working conditions.  
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i ‘Above-the–line’ workers are considered to be the key creative inputs for a film (such as stars, directors and 
writers), have individually negotiated salaries and “are named explicitly as line item entries in any project 
budget” (Scott, 2005: 121). These workers are often then viewed as ‘skilled’. ‘Below-the-line’ workers are then 
considered to be semi-skilled, technicians or ‘crew’. 
ii Along with these two categories, an in-between status was created in some legislation: “dependent 
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